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A First Look at the Plea Deal Experiences
of Juveniles Tried in Adult Court
Tarika Daftary-Kapur
Criminal Justice Department, Fairleigh Dickinson University, Teaneck, New Jersey, USA
Tina M. Zottoli
Psychology Department, St. Joseph’s College, New York, New York, USA
While there is a large body of research on the legal capacities of adolescents, this research
largely has neglected the plea-deal context. To learn about adolescents’ understanding of the
plea process and their appreciation of the short- and long-term consequences of accepting a
plea deal, we conducted interviews with 40 juveniles who were offered plea deals in adult
criminal court. Participants displayed limited understanding of the plea process, were not
fully aware of their legal options and appeared to be overly influenced by the short-term
benefits associated with accepting their plea deals. Limited contact with attorneys may have
contributed to poor understanding. Although preliminary, our results suggest that these youth
might be at increased risk for due-process rights violations. We use these data to point to
several open research questions on the plea-deal process for youth charged as adults.
Keywords: juvenile offenders, plea bargaining, plea deals, juvenile competency, legal
decisions, adolescent decision making
Each year, approximately 250,000 juveniles are adjudicated
in criminal court (Daglis, Lanza-Kaduce, Odgers, &
Wollard, 2005), and the vast majority of these cases are dis-
posed of via plea deals (Rosenmerkel, Durose, & Farole,
2010). Pleading guilty to a felony in adult court may result
in the loss of a number of rights and privileges and is asso-
ciated with several negative long-term consequences
(Redding, 2003). While there is a large body of research on
the adjudicative competence of adolescents (e.g., on the
capacity of youth to stand trial or waive Miranda; Cooper,
1997; Grisso, 1981; Grisso et al., 2003; Redlich, Silverman,
& Steiner, 2003; Viljoen, Odgers, Grisso, & Tillbrook,
2007;Viljoen & Roesch, 2005) and on the experiences and
outcomes of youth in criminal court (e.g., Redding, 2003
for a review; Schubert et al., 2010), the plea-bargain con-
text largely has been neglected (see Redlich, 2010, for simi-
lar comment).
This gap in the research must be addressed, as most
juveniles charged in adult court accept plea deals1 and the
decisions faced in the context of a plea negotiation may dif-
fer considerably from those of a trial. This article provides
a ‘first look’ at the plea deal experiences of juveniles who
have been charged and processed in adult criminal court.
Our study had three primary objectives:
1. To understand the experiences and perceptions these
juveniles have of the plea bargain process, including
their perceptions of voluntariness and their relation-
ships and interactions with their attorneys.
2. To identify possible deficits in legal knowledge (both
general knowledge about plea deals and knowledge
specific to the juveniles’ own situations), and in
appreciation of legal outcomes for the juveniles’ own
lives.
Address correspondence to Tarika Daftary-Kapur, 1000 River Road,
Teaneck, NJ 07666, USA. E-mail: tdkapur@fdu.edu
Color versions of one or more of the figures in the article can be found
online at http://www.tandfonline.com/ufmh.
1While the exact number of cases that are resolved through plea bar-
gaining is unknown, scholars estimate that 90 to 95 percent of both federal
and state court cases involving juveniles are resolved through plea deals
(Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2005).
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3. To identify the factors considered by these juveniles
in their decision making (although decision-making
capacities were not directly assessed).
To accomplish these aims, we interviewed 40 juveniles
who were offered, or had taken, a plea deal for a felony
offense in adult criminal court. To our knowledge, this is
the first time a sample of juveniles charged as adults have
been interviewed about their plea deal experiences. As
such, this study was exploratory in nature, and designed to
help generate hypotheses for future research.
Constitutional Protections
When a court accepts a guilty plea it is presumed that the
defendant has the ability to make a knowing and voluntary
decision (that is, the defendant meets the constitutional
minimum for adjudicative competence) and that the
defendant’s actual decision to enter a plea is both knowing
and voluntary (typically established by the judge during the
plea colloquy). These conditions are meant to protect the
defendant against both dispositional and situational factors
that could potentially render the plea process unfair or coer-
cive. Thus, with respect to juveniles who accept plea deals,
there are two questions that might be considered: (1) Are
youth legally competent to make plea decisions? and, if so,
(2) Are the actual decisions made by youth knowing and
voluntary? These two prongs are discussed below.
Competency
In Godinez v. Moran (1993) the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the threshold for competency to plead guilty is the same
as that for trial competency established byDusky v. US, 1960:
whether the defendant has “sufficient present ability to con-
sult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding” and a “rational as well as factual understand-
ing of the proceedings against him.” Competent individuals
can understand the nature of the proceedings brought against
them, can reason among options presented and explained to
them by counsel and have an appreciation (that is, a realistic
understanding) of the potential consequences of the proceed-
ings for their own circumstances (Bonnie, 1992).
Knowing and Voluntary
While competency is a necessary prerequisite for
whether or not a defendant’s plea is knowing and voluntary,
the courts have long recognized that the will of an other-
wise competent defendant can be overpowered by either
intentional or unintentional coercive practices on the part
of the state. In fact, until 1970, U.S. courts, including the
Supreme Court, differentiated only slightly, if at all,
between a confession made in police custody and a guilty
plea entered in court; both confessions and guilty pleas
entered in court must be, as guaranteed by the 14th
amendment, voluntary and knowing, and offers of leniency
to induce either were broadly condemned by the courts (see
Dervan, 2012 for review). In Brady v. United States (1970)
the plea-bargain was deemed constitutional and the case
law regarding confessions and guilty pleas began to
diverge; nonetheless, in Brady and related cases that fol-
lowed (e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 1978; North Carolina
V. Alford, 1970) the Court emphasized that the incentives
that are made in the context of a plea deal not be such that
they overpower the will of a defendant; furthermore,
“waivers of constitutional rights [e.g., the right to a trial]
not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelli-
gent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant cir-
cumstances and likely consequences.” A knowing and
voluntary waiver is one for which an individual understands
his or her available options and the likely consequences
associated with the options, and is free from undue external
influence in making his or her choice.
Adolescents in Criminal Court
Several lines of research suggest that adolescents, as a
group, may have deficits in the capacities needed to compe-
tently enter into plea agreements and that they may be more
vulnerable to suggestion and more easily coerced than
adults. Adolescent decision making may be compromised
by a tendency to focus on short- rather than long-term, or
positive rather than negative, consequences (e.g., Crone &
van der Molen, 2004; Hooper, Luciana, Conklin, & Yarger,
2004; Miller & Byrnes, 2001a, 2001b) and by a failure to
attend to risk (e.g., Lewis, 1981). Adolescents may be less
likely to recognize the full range of options available to
them or the full range of outcomes associated with a given
option, and they may value the possible outcomes associ-
ated with decisions differently from adults (Miller &
Byrnes, 2001a, 2001b). Adolescents also have particular
difficulty countering dysregulating influences in situations
that are emotionally laden or that exert high cognitive
demand (Crone, 2009; van Duijvenvoorde, Jansen, Visser,
& Huizenga, 2010). It is well established that the neural
networks important for value laden decision-making are
undergoing substantial maturational change during adoles-
cence (e.g., Ernst, Romeo, & Andersen, 2009), and the pro-
tracted development of the pre-frontal cortex relative to the
earlier maturation of the limbic system may explain, in
part, the increased vulnerability of adolescents to poor
judgment in emotionally charged contexts (e.g., Galvan
et al., 2006).
Arguably, few situations are as fraught with emotion as
the pre-adjudicative and adjudicative processes. Thus, it is
not surprising that developmental differences have surfaced
in the psycho-legal literature. Most of the research on the
legal capacities of adolescents has focused on competency
to stand trial and competency to waive Miranda rights. The
general consensus of the competency research is that
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adolescents as a group, but especially those who are youn-
ger than 16, are more likely than adults to have deficits in
the capacities necessary to participate competently in crimi-
nal trials (Cooper, 1997; Grisso et al., 2003; McKee, 1995;
Redlich et al., 2003; Savitsky & Karras, 1984; Viljoen &
Grisso, 2007), and adolescents with below average IQs may
be at greatest risk (e.g., Grisso et al., 2003). Furthermore,
teaching to enhance competency related abilities may bene-
fit only the oldest adolescents (Viljoen & Grisso, 2007).
Adolescents are also less likely than adults to compre-
hend and appreciate Miranda warnings, putting them at
increased risk to waive their rights unknowingly (Grisso,
1981; Redlich et al., 2003; Viljoen & Roesch, 2005); those
who are 14 years of age or younger may be at the greatest
risk (Grisso, 1981). The impact of deficits in Miranda
comprehension is highlighted by the false-confessions litera-
ture, which suggests that the prevalence of false confessions
is disproportionately higher among youth (Drizin & Leo,
2004). It appears that juveniles are more susceptible than
adults to suggestive questioning, pressure from authority fig-
ures, and the use of deception (Gudjonsson, 2003; Redlich &
Goodman, 2003; Scott-Hayward, 2007). They are also more
likely than adults to waive their rights during police ques-
tioning (Abramovitch, Peterson-Badali, & Rohan, 1995).
Adolescents in the Plea Negotiation Context
Taken together, these data give us reason to believe that
adolescents’ understanding and appreciation of the plea
negotiation process will be similarly compromised. To our
knowledge, only two published studies have examined this
question directly. Grisso et al. (2003) explored judgment
and decision-making in three hypothetical legal scenarios
(an interrogation, an attorney consult, and a plea deal) in
detained delinquents and adult offenders, and in matched
community samples. Juveniles were more likely to accept a
plea deal than were adults, and across scenarios, juveniles
younger than 15 years old were more likely than older juve-
niles and adults to make choices that signified compliance
with authority. Also, adolescents under the age of 14 were
less likely than older adolescents and adults to recognize
the long-term consequences of their decisions. These results
are limited by the use of hypothetical vignettes that lack the
real-world consequences of a plea negotiation, and may
underestimate age-related differences.
Viljoen, Klaver, and Roesch (2005) interviewed a sam-
ple of detained juvenile delinquents about their actual and
anticipated plea decisions. More than half of the sample
reported that their attorneys advised them how to plea.
Among older adolescents (>15 years), peer advice and sub-
jective ratings of the strength of the evidence against them
was associated with whether or not they planned to take a
plea. Legal understanding of plea deals and appreciation
for long-term outcomes of accepting a plea were not specif-
ically assessed in this study.
Importantly, neither of these studies included juveniles
who were adjudicated in the adult system. While it is tempt-
ing to extrapolate data from juvenile court samples to the
population of youth adjudicated as adults, youth in adult
court are, on average, older than juvenile court samples,
may differ in demographic composition (Males &Macallair,
2000), and are usually charged with more serious crimes.
Also, the juvenile justice system functions differently from
the adult system, in terms of both processes and penalties.
We sought to address this critical gap in the research
by directly interviewing juveniles in the adult system
about their plea deal experiences. Our goals were to
understand their experiences and their perceptions of the
plea process and to identify possible deficits in legal
understanding and appreciation of consequences that
might be the subject of future research. To our knowl-
edge, this is the first study on the plea deal experiences
of youth who have been adjudicated as adults. We did
not set out to test specific hypotheses, but on the basis of
existing research we expected that our participants would
show some deficits in basic legal knowledge and that our
participants would be influenced more strongly by short-
rather than long- term consequences.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 40 juvenile offenders, charged as adults in
New York City. The participants were between the ages of
13 and 18 at the time of interview (M D 15.86, SD D 1.25)
and their average age at the time of offense was 15 years,
(SD D .74).2 The majority of participants (80%, n D 32)
were male and 62.5% of the participants identified as
Black/African-American (nD 25). The remainder identified
as Hispanic (15%, n D 6), mixed race (20%, n D 8) or
White (2.5%, n D 1). Education level ranged from ninth
grade to twelfth grade (mode: tenth grade). On average
youth had .80 prior arrests (SD D 1.39, ranging from 0–5,
mode D 0). Only four participants had a prior adjudication
in juvenile court, and two had prior adult convictions.
All participants in our sample had either accepted a
guilty plea for a felony offense in adult criminal court in
New York State (n D 32; 80%), or were in the pre-trial pro-
cess and had been offered plea deals (n D 8; 20%). Of the
eight youth who were offered but had not accepted deals,
seven said they were going to accept their deals and one
planned to go to trial.
2All participants in our study were charged, in criminal court, before
age 16. In New York State, the upper limit of the juvenile court is 16 years;
juveniles between the ages of 13 and 16 are waived to adult court automati-
cally if they are charged with one of 17 designated offenses that mandate
adult adjudication.
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Participants were sampled from community-based alter-
native-to-incarceration (ATI) programs in New York City.
In New York City the majority of youth sentenced in crimi-
nal court are sentenced to probation (61% in 2012; Gewirtz,
2014); this includes 59% of those with Class B felonies and
58% of those with Class C or D felonies. While on proba-
tion, youth are normally mandated to attend ATIs that pro-
vide counseling, job training and other services.
Additionally, 98% of juveniles charged as adults are man-
dated to attend ATIs during the pendency of their cases
(Gewirtz, 2014). All youth at the facilities were invited to
participate in the study and the final sample was representa-
tive of the population of juvenile offenders in New York




Information was collected on age, sex, race/ethnicity,
education level, mental health history, and prior juvenile
and criminal justice involvement for all participants.
Interview Protocol
Our structured interview addressed four areas 3 relevant
to plea decision making: (1) basic legal understanding, (2)
appreciation, (3) voluntariness, and (4) attorney relation-
ship/communications.
 Basic Legal Understanding: These questions assessed
knowledge of the plea process, the nature of guilty
pleas, rights attached to the defendant during the plea
bargaining process, and the consequences of accept-
ing a guilty plea.
 Appreciation: This section addressed the recognition
of the impact of events on the participant’s own cir-
cumstances. Questions assessed understanding of the
terms of the plea that has been or will be accepted and
of the consequences (both short-term and long-term)
of accepting the plea. We also asked open ended ques-
tions about the factors that contributed to the
offender’s plea decision.
 Voluntariness: These items assessed the offender’s per-
ception of the fairness of the process, his/her autonomy
to make decisions and the role of counsel, peers, and
parents or other adults in the decision-making process.
 Attorney Relationship: These questions addressed
likeability and trust of attorneys, information received
from attorneys about the process, and the number of
times the offenders met/had contact with their attor-
neys and under what circumstances.
Our goal was to collect information on participants’
spontaneous responses, thus the majority of our interview
questions were open-ended. Basic probes (e.g., “is there
anything else you can think of?”) were used when neces-
sary. Research assistants were trained to ask follow-up
questions for definitional items and when they did not
understand a participant’s response. Follow-up questions
were recorded in the interview notes.
Procedure
All procedures were approved by the Institutional Review
Boards at the authors’ institutions and were carried out in
accordance with the ethical guidelines for human subject
research outlined by the American Psychological Associa-
tion. Permission was granted by the ATI sites to recruit par-
ticipants and conduct interviews onsite. No identifying
information was collected and participants were instructed
not to disclose the charge for which they had been sentenced.
We did not query youth on the offense(s) for which they had
been sentenced—this was part of our agreement with the
interview sites, as some of the participants’ cases were still
in progress—but we did ask each participant about the terms
of the deal that had been accepted/offered and about the
alternatives with which he/she had been presented.
Participants were recruited at four ATI programs for
youth in New York City. Information regarding the study
was presented to the prospective participants in group set-
tings and they were asked to complete a sign-up sheet if
interested, providing the contact information for their
parents/guardians. They also had the option of contacting
the principal investigators or program staff at a later date if
they decided they were interested in participating. Parents/
legal guardians were contacted via phone and verbal con-
sent was obtained; contact information for parents and
guardians was cross-referenced with ATI site records. Con-
fidentiality was assured except for reports of abuse or
threats of harm to self or others. After obtaining verbal con-
sent, a time and date was arranged with ATI program staff
to conduct the interview with the participant. At the time of
the interview, verbal assent was obtained from the partici-
pant and a written form was also provided.
Interviews were conducted in private rooms at the ATI
facilities and lasted approximately 30 minutes. The inter-
views were conducted by the principal investigators and
two trained research assistants. Of the 40 interviews, 15
were conducted by the PIs, and the remaining interviews
were conducted by the research assistants. To maintain con-
sistency across interviews, all interviewers followed a script
and all questions were asked in the same order for each par-
ticipant. At the conclusion of the interviews, participants
were given $25 American Express gift cards.
3Sections one and two of our interview protocol were influenced by
Bonnie’s (1993) conceptualization of competency to stand trial in that
these sections address basic legal knowledge and appreciation of the out-
comes for one’s own situation.
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Data Analysis
Interviews were transcribed and the transcribed statements
were subjected to a content analysis. Given that this study
was exploratory in nature, coding categories were devel-
oped using both deductive (i.e., derived from prior
research) and inductive (i.e., derived from the raw data col-
lected) methods (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Deductive codes
were established a priori, based on prior research on ado-
lescent decision making (e.g., coding responses for short-
versus long-term orientation). For codes developed induc-
tively, the two PIs independently read all the interviews
and developed a list of initial categories and a general cod-
ing framework for analyzing the interviews based on emer-
gent themes. After each PI developed her set of themes and
categories, the two PIs discussed these categories, recon-
ciled differences, and developed formal codes by which to
categorize interview responses. Final coding categories
were then established using the constant-comparative
method, which entails the systematic comparison of each
new text to be assigned to a category with each of those texts
that has already been assigned to the category (Glaser &
Strauss, 1967). The unit of analysis was the sentence and
each sentence, considered a “text chunk,” was coded for
each of these categories. Although one text-chunk could be
coded under more than one category, categories were
defined in such a way that they were internally as homoge-
nous as possible and externally as heterogeneous as possible.
The final set of categories measured the following content
domains: basic legal understanding of the plea process, the
identified reason for accepting a plea, identified consequen-
ces of accepting (and not accepting) a felony plea, whether
an identified consequence reflected a long- or short-term ori-
entation, and the amount and quality of attorney communi-
cation. For ease of interpretation, specific coding schemes
are presented before each set of respective results.
Once the coding schemes were finalized, we randomly
selected 10 interviews that would be coded by both PIs to
establish interrater reliability. Interrater reliability was
acceptable at kappa D .84 (Altman, 1991; Landis & Koch,
1977), with individual kappa ranging from .78 to .90. Once
interrater reliability was established we reconciled differen-
ces, and then randomly divided the remaining 30 inter-
views, which were coded independently. Once all the data
were content coded, we tabulated results and analyzed data
using descriptive statistics.
RESULTS
We present our findings in four broad categories—general
legal understanding, appreciation of consequences, volun-
tariness, and attorney relationship and communication. All
information we report here was obtained through direct
interviews with participants and responses were not
corroborated by collateral sources. Self-report data is, of
course, the only way to glean a realistic understanding of
the perspective of the juvenile offender, but, as is true for
all types of self-report research, interpretation of our data is
limited by the possibility of inaccurate reporting (uninten-
tional or intentional) and forgetting. To minimize for-
getting, data were collected as close in time to the plea
decision as possible (between a few weeks and a few
months, and rarely longer). Although we could not elimi-
nate any possibility of a participant intentionally providing
a false report, there was no incentive to lie on this inter-
view. We did not ask participants about the nature of their
alleged crimes or about their guilt or innocence, and the
questions about their personal legal situations were
restricted exclusively to their decision-making processes.
GENERAL LEGAL UNDERSTANDING
OF PLEA DEALS
The first section of our interview asked general questions
about legal process and about factors that might affect a
person’s decision to accept a plea deal. These items were
unrelated to the participants’ personal situations.
Understanding of Plea Deals
Variables and Coding
General understanding of plea deals was assessed with
an open-ended question: “Can you tell me, in your own
words, what a plea deal is?” After a participant provided an
initial response, we queried (query: “anything else”) to
determine whether they would provide additional informa-
tion. Participants’ spontaneous responses were scored
against a set of five definitional criteria. Using the definition
of a plea bargain given by West’s Encyclopedia of Ameri-
can Law (Lehman & Phelps, 2004), we developed a “basic
legal understanding” variable that was scored from 1 to 5,
with one point given for each of the following five aspects
of a plea deal the youth mentioned in their spontaneous
responses: (1) a plea is an admission of guilt, (2) a plea deal
includes an offer of reduced charges/time, (3) the offer is
made by the prosecutor, (4), a plea implies waiver of right
to trial, and (5) a plea implies waiver of right to appeal (see
Table 1).4 This open-ended question was followed by a
number of specific follow-up questions (e.g., does a person
admit that he did something wrong when he accepts a plea
deal?), with one point scored for each correct answer.
4The broad definition of a guilty plea also includes waivers of other
rights granted by the fifth and sixth amendment, such as the right against
self-incrimination and the right to confront witnesses. We limited our legal
understanding variable to these basic elements because we did not want to
bias legal understanding scores in in the direction of our initial
expectations.
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Results
None of the participants spontaneously mentioned (or
recognized after follow-up questions), all five aspects of a
plea deal. Approximately 16% mentioned three aspects,
38% mentioned two, 35% mentioned one, and 11% did not
mention any. Table 2 shows the total number of partici-
pants who identified each element, as well as whether the
element was identified spontaneously or only after follow-
up questioning. The most frequently identified elements
were admission of guilt (87.5%, n D 35), offered by the
prosecutor (82.5%, n D 33) and reduced charges/time, 45%
(n D 18). These responses were followed by the recognition
that the right to trial would be waived (12.5%, n D 5). No
participants mentioned that entering plea included a waiver
of the right to appeal; however, we did not ask this question
directly on follow-up.
Factors that Influence Plea Decisions
Variables and Coding
Participants were asked to describe the kinds of things a
person might think about when deciding to accept a plea
deal. Based on the responses the question elicited, we cre-
ated a variable that coded for the identified reason a plea
deal might be accepted (e.g., to end the legal process; to get
a lower sentence) and variables that coded for identified
outcomes/consequences of accepting and not accepting a
plea deal (e.g., having a criminal record; difficulties with
employment; See Table 3 for codes, definitions, and exam-
ple responses). Then, based on existing research, which
suggests that youth attend more to the short- rather than
long-term consequences of a decision (e.g., Crone & van
der Molen, 2004; Hooper et al., 2004; Huizenga, Crone, &
Jansen 2007; Steinberg et al., 2009), we coded each
response—whether the response was a “reason for taking a
plea deal” or a “consequence associated with accepting a
plea deal”—as reflecting a long- (e.g., difficulty finding
employment with a criminal record) or short-term orienta-
tion (e.g., getting out of jail that night). Throughout the
Results section, the sum of the percentages of youth provid-
ing responses may be greater than 100 on items for which
some youth provided more than one response.
Results
The most commonly cited reason for why someone
might accept a plea deal was “to give up fighting the sys-
tem” (35%, n D 14); 25% (n D 10) stated that it was to get
a lower sentence; 25% (n D 10) stated that the reason to
take a plea was to get out of jail as soon as possible, and
12.5% (n D 5) stated that it was to avoid a sentence of jail/
prison time. Finally, 5% (n D 2) stated that a person will
accept a plea deal to get a second chance. The majority
(60%) of the identified reasons reflected a short-term
orientation.
TABLE 1
Coding for Elements of Plea Deal: Coding Categories, Definition of Qualifying Responses and Example Responses
Category Definition Examples
Guilt Mentioned that taking a plea includes an admission of
guilt
“You have to admit what you did”
“You have to say you did what they are charging you with”
Reduced time/charges Mentioned that a plea deal includes an offer of reduced
time and/or charges
“The judge offers you lower charges if you say you did it.”
“It’s when you say you did something wrong and
they give you less time, or no time.”
Offer Mentioned that the plea offer is made by the prosecutor “Offered by the judge and D.A.”
“The prosecutor give you the plea”
Trial waiver Mentioned that accepting a plea implies a waiver of the
right to a trial
“If you take a plea, then you can’t go to trial”
“With my plea I can’t go to trial anymore”
Appeal waiver Mentioned that accepting a plea implies a waiver of the
right to appeal
No participants mentioned this element
TABLE 2
Elements of a Plea Deal Mentioned by Participants Spontaneously and After Direct Probe
Number Who Mentioned Element Spontaneously Number Who Correctly Answered Follow-Up Question Total
Elements of a Plea Deal
Admission of Guilt 75% (n D 30) 12.5% (n D 5) 87.5% (n D 35)
Reduced time/charges 45% (n D 18) 0% (n D 0) 45% (n D 18)
Offered by prosecutor 10% (n D 4) 72.5% (n D 29) 82.5% (n D 33)
Waiver of right to trial 5% (n D 2) 7.5% (n D 3) 12.5% (n D 5)
Waiver of right to appeal 0% (n D 0) NA* 0% (n D 0)
Note. *We did not ask a direct follow-up question regarding the right to appeal which is a limitation of the current study.
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Participants mentioned few collateral consequences
(e.g., eligibility for certain entitlement programs) associ-
ated with accepting a plea for a felony offense. The major-
ity of youth (57.5%, n D 23) mentioned one consequence,
17.5% (n D 7) mentioned two, 20% (n D 8) mentioned
three, and 5% (n D 2) did not mention any collateral conse-
quences of taking a plea. The most common consequences
mentioned by participants were difficulty with employment
(82.5%, n D 33), having a criminal record (40%, n D 16),
and not being able to go to college (27.5%, n D 11; presum-
ably these responses referred to restrictions in obtaining
financial aid, but we did not query this further). A handful
of participants mentioned being denied access to public
housing (10%, n D 4). One hundred percent of consequen-
ces mentioned reflected a long-term orientation.
Participants mentioned very few potential consequences
associated with rejecting a plea offer (mode D 2). The
majority of participants (70%, n D 28) believed that if a
person rejects a plea deal they would receive a higher
penalty—most mentioned the prison time associated with
the original charge. Other consequences mentioned
included being sent back to jail or remanded if one rejected
a plea offer (55%, n D 22), the possibility of a trial (30%, n
D 12) and being offered a new deal at a later stage in the
process (25%, n D 10). Overall, 31% of responses reflected
a short-term orientation, and 69% reflected a long-term one.
Appreciation of Personal Consequences
The second section of the interview addressed the recogni-
tion of the impact of events on the participants’ own circum-
stances. Participants were queried on understanding of the
terms of the plea that has been, or will be, accepted (includ-
ing consequences of violations) and of the consequences
(both short-term and long-term) of accepting the plea. We
also asked about the factors that contributed to their own
decisions.
TABLE 3
Coding for General Factors That Influence Plea Decisions: Coding Categories, Definition of Qualifying Responses and Example Responses
Category Definition Examples
Reason For Taking Plea Deal
End the legal process* Mentioned that a person takes a plea to end the legal
process
“You’ll stop going to court. Be done with it.”
“[you take the deal] To give up to get out of court”
Get a lower sentence** Mentioned that a person takes a plea to get a lower
sentence than what he/she would get if found guilty at
trial
“How much time they would have to do, get less time if
they take a plea”
“less jail [prison] time”
Give up fighting the system* Mentioned that a person takes a plea to give up fighting
the system
“To get out, to give up. They make you plead guilty
before investigation”
“When you’re tired of fighting the case”
Get out of jail* Mentioned that a person takes a plea to get out of jail
and go home
“Long time [waiting] in jail if you don’t take it”
“Not wanting jail anymore”
Get a second chance** Mentioned that a person takes a plea to get a second
chance through programs etc.
“Chance to start over”
“I wanted to learn something from experience”
Consequences of accepting
Employment difficulties** Mentioned that taking a plea leads to difficulties with
getting a job
“Getting a job, maybe some other stuff”
“Getting a job, trying to work somewhere”
Criminal record** Mentioned that taking a plea leads to a felony record N/A; closed ended question
Not being able to attend college** Mentioned that taking a plea (and due to that having a
record) makes it harder to attend college
“[Can’t] go to school or college”
“[it would be harder] to go to college”
Access to public housing** Mentioned that taking a plea (and due to that having a
record) makes it harder to get public housing
“Can’t get housing”
“. . .govt. housing”
Consequences of Rejecting
Prison Time** Mentioned that rejecting a plea would lead to a longer
prison sentence associated with the original charge
“If you don’t plead the judge will give you more time.”
“They might get sentenced, time might be longer.”
Jail/Remand* Mentioned that rejecting a plea would lead to going
back to jail or remanded to detention
“He’ll go back to jail”
“Long time [waiting] in jail if you don’t take it, or get
found guilty anyway.”
Trial* Mentioned that rejecting a plea would lead to a trial “He’d stay in Court. Jury would have said he’s guilty
and he would have gone to prison”
“Probably would have gone to trial and offered
probation”
New deal* Mentioned that rejecting a plea would lead to a new
offer later in the process
“Go back to jail and will have to wait till the next deal is
given”
“Remanded and sent to jail to wait a new deal”
Note. *Response coded as reflecting short-term orientation; **Response coded as reflecting long-term orientation.
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Awareness of Terms
Variables and Coding
Participants were asked what would happen if they
did not fulfill the terms of their plea deals. This question
was scored according to whether the youth’s response
indicated that he/she understood the consequences asso-
ciated with violations (e.g., remand to jail; dismissal of
plea deal).
Results
The majority of the participants (80%; n D 32) were
aware of the consequences they would face if they did not
fulfill the terms of their plea deals.
Consequences of Accepting or Rejecting a Plea
Variables and Coding
We asked participants what would happen if they
accepted (or rejected) their plea offers. We coded these
responses on two variables: whether participants had an
accurate knowledge of legal process (knowledge of pro-
cess) and whether they were able to identify outcomes
related to accepting or rejecting a plea deal (outcomes).
For knowledge of process, responses were scored against
three a priori criteria—whether participants knew who
had made the plea offer to them, whether they knew they
had a right to trial, and whether they knew that a trial
was the next step in the process if they chose not to
accept a plea offer. As before, outcome responses were
further coded as to whether they reflected long- versus
short-term consequence. See Table 4 for codes, defini-
tions, and example responses.
Results
All youth (100%, n D 40) knew that the offer was made
to them by the prosecutor. In contrast, while 60% (n D 24)
of youth knew that they had a right to trial generally, but
when asked directly about their case, only 10% (n D 4)
identified a trial as the next step in the process if they chose
not to accept a plea deal.
Only a minority of participants (25%, n D 10) articu-
lated any outcomes associated with accepting their plea
deals. Of those who mentioned any outcomes, 80%
(n D 8) mentioned that by taking a plea they would
now have a criminal record; 70% (n D 7) mentioned
difficulties with securing employment; and 30% (n D 3)
mentioned that they would have difficulties going to
school/college. All the outcomes identified reflected a
long-term orientation. Sixty-five percent (n D 26) of the
youth were able to identify outcomes associated with
rejecting their plea deals. Among youth who mentioned
any outcomes, 100% (n D 26) mentioned receiving a
higher penalty than that being offered in the plea deal,
15% (n D 4) mentioned going to trial, 11.5% (n D 3)
mentioned being sent back to jail/remanded, and 7.5%
(n D 2) mentioned that a new deal would be offered to
them at a later stage. Of the outcomes associated with
rejecting a plea, 77% reflected a long-term orientation.
Factors that Influenced Offenders’ Plea Decisions
Variables and Coding
Participants were asked about the factors that influenced
their own decisions to take a plea (e.g., what things did you
think about when you were deciding to take your plea-
deal?). Based on the responses the question elicited, we
TABLE 4
Coding for Consequences of Accepting or Rejecting Own Plea Deal: Coding Categories, Definition of Qualifying Responses
and Example Responses
Category Definition Examples
Acceptance of plea deal
Criminal record** Mentioned that they would have a criminal record by
accepting a plea deal
N/A; Closed ended question
Employment** Mentioned that they would face employment difficulties
by accepting a plea deal
“Hard to get a job, because of the background check”
Financial aid** Mentioned they would face issues securing financial aid
in college by accepting a plea deal
“Getting money for school, college”
Rejection of plea deal
Higher penalty** Mentioned that they would receive a higher penalty if
they rejected a plea deal
“I took the plea because I didn’t want to go to jail for
7 years.”
Trial* Mentioned that they would go to trial if they rejected a
plea deal
“If I didn’t plead guilty I would have to go on with all
the other charges and go to trial”
Jail/remand* Mentioned that they would go back to jail if they
rejected a plea deal
“Didn’t want to [wait in] jail. Needed my freedom”
New deal* Mentioned that they would get a new deal at a later
stage if they rejected a plea deal
“I’ll go to jail until they give me a new deal”
Note. *Reflected short-term orientation **Reflected long-term orientation.
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created a variable that coded for factors that influenced a
participant’s decision for accepting a plea deal. As before,
we then coded each response as to whether it reflected a
long- or short-term orientation. See Table 5 for definitions
and participant examples.
Results
Only 50% of the participants described the factors that
influenced their decision. Most of these responses reflected
concern about short-term outcomes such as being able to go
home after accepting a plea as opposed to being remanded
(70%, n D 14), not wanting to stay in jail for the remainder
of the process (50%, n D 10), losing friends (40%, n D 8),
and being tired of the legal/court process and wanting it to
end (60%, n D 12). Only seven youth (17%) mentioned any
long-term consequences. These included problems getting
a job (57%, n D 4) or finishing school (28.5%, n D 2), and
not being able to form long-term relationships (28.5%,
n D 2). Overall, 85% of responses reflected a short-term
orientation and of the participants who responded, 30%
(n D 6) mentioned both short- and long-term consequences,
60% (n D 12) mentioned only short-term consequences,
and 10% (n D 2) mentioned only long-term consequences.
See Figure 1 for visual display of factors that influenced
the youths’ plea decisions.
Voluntariness of the Plea Decision Process
The third section of our interview assessed the participant’s
perception of the fairness of the process, his/her autonomy
to make decisions, and the role of peers, parents or other
adults in the decision-making process.
Variables and Coding
We asked participants a series of closed ended questions
aimed at their decision-making autonomy (e.g., did you
take the plea because you wanted to or someone else
wanted you to? Did you know how your parents wanted
you to plead?), followed by an open-ended question asking
how they made their final decisions to accept their pleas.
Based on participants’ responses to the closed- and open-
ended questions, we coded their plea decisions as being
completely autonomous, made in conjunction with parents/
guardians, or being highly influenced by others (i.e., choos-
ing a plea because others strongly encouraged them to
accept it, when they may not have wanted to or may not
have had a strong preference). See Table 6 for codes, defi-
nitions, and participant examples.
Results
Overall, 50% (n D 20) of the participants said that they
knew how their attorneys wanted them to plead, and 80%
(n D 32) said that they knew how their parents/guardians
wanted them to plead. For the 10 youth reporting that their
peers were involved in their alleged offense, 40% (n D 4)
said that they knew how their peers wanted them to plead.
Of those who were aware of the opinions of others, the
overwhelming majority said that they had been advised to
plead guilty (95%). Nonetheless, when asked who made the
ultimate decision to plead guilty, the majority of partici-
pants (93.5%, n D 39) reported that they decided for
TABLE 5
Coding for Factors That Influenced Participants’ Own Decisions to Take a Plea: Coding Categories, Definition of Qualifying Responses
and Example Responses
Category Definition Examples
Going home* Mentioned wanting to go home as soon as possible;
being released after accepting a plea
“Cause I wanted to go home”
“. . .going home”
Jail* Mentioned not wanting to stay in jail during the court
process
“To get out of jail”
“I didn’t want to stay in jail”
Losing friends* Mentioned not wanting to lose friends because of time
spent in court or because of court requirements
“I didn’t want to be a snitch on my friends”
“Can’t spend time with my friends.”
Tired of legal process/court* Mentioned being tired of the legal process/wanting the
legal process to end/tired of going to court
“I just wanted to be done with [the legal process]”
“Didn’t want to go to court. If I didn’t take it they would
set another court date and I would have to prove I
didn’t do it”
“I was happy to stop going to Court, so [my attorney]
said I could stop doing that [if I took the plea]”
Employment** Mentioned having problems getting a job “. . . get a job”
“job cause no one wants to hire a felon”
School** Mentioned being able to go back to school “. . .going to college”
“. . .getting in a good school”
Relationships** Mentioned not being able to form long-term
relationships if sent to prison
“Not have friends. Be hard later [to make friends]”
“Won’t be able to have a family”
Note. *Reflected short-term orientation; **Reflected long-term orientation.
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themselves whether or not they would take the plea.
Although the majority of participants reported making the
decision for themselves, responses to the open-ended ques-
tion suggested that many of the participants made their
decisions together with their parents or guardians (51.6%,
n D 16) and a small percentage of participant decisions
were highly influenced by parents and/or attorneys (12.9%;
n D 4). A small percentage of participants in the sample
(15%, n D 6) reported that they accepted a plea completely
voluntarily because they believed it would give them a
second chance and that the terms of the plea (e.g., going to
a treatment program) would be beneficial to them.
Relationship and Communication with Attorneys
The final section of our interview addressed likeability and
trust of attorneys, information received from attorneys
about the process, and the number of times participants
met/had contact with their attorneys and under what
circumstances.
Relationship
Participants were asked to rate how much they trusted
their attorneys on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 4 (completely).
TABLE 6
Coding for Autonomy of Decision: Coding Category, Definition of Qualifying Responses and Example Responses
Category Definition Examples
Autonomy Coding was based on a combination of responses from
the following questions: “Who decided you should
take the plea deal”; “What did your parents want you
to do? Take the plea or not?”; (If friends were
involved) “did your friends want you to take the
plea?”; “Did your lawyer tell you what you what
would happen if you didn’t take the plea?”; “Did you
have to take the plea or did you have a choice?”; “In
the end, why did you decide to take/reject the plea?”
Autonomous Decision to take plea was completely autonomous “I decided [to take the plea]. . ..my dad wanted to me to
take the 1 year in jail. . .he [attorney] said if I didn’t
[take the deal] I would spend 8 months in prison. . .[I
decided to take the plea] Cause I wanted to be free.
Thinking about giving up freedom for something you
didn’t do. Hell no. I wasn’t going to do that.”
Combined Decision to take plea was a combined one between
youth and parents/attorney
“Everyone played a role. . ..[parents wanted me to] take
the plea. . .attorney said [if I didn’t take the plea] I
would go to jail and then probation. . .had a choice [to
accept or reject plea]. . .[took the plea to spend] less
time in jail.
Highly influenced Decision to take plea was highly influenced by the
opinion of others
“my lawyer [decided]. . .[my parents] left it up to me. . .
[my attorney said] that a trial would be a waste of
time. . .[I decided to take the plea] because my lawyer
said to”
Figure 1. Percentage of responses reflecting short- and long-term orientation.
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The average score was 2.88 (SD D .93). Participants were
also asked their level of agreement with the statement, “I
got along with my attorney” on a scale of 1 (completely dis-
agree) to 5 (completely agree). The average rating was 3.91
(SD 1.09).
Contact and Communication
On average youth met/talked with their attorneys
2.74 times (SD D 1.36, mode D 3, range D 0–6 times).
This average does not include one participant who met with
his private attorney 20 times. Youth were asked when they
first met their attorneys. The most frequent response was
“central booking” (32.5%; n D 15), followed by “at arrest”
(20%, n D 8), at first court appearance (17.5%, n D 7), or
other (12.5%, n D 5). Data were missing for seven (17.5%)
participants.
Finally, we asked participants whether their attorneys
had offered them a choice other than accepting the plea and
whether their attorneys had told them what would happen if
they didn’t take the plea deal. Forty percent (n D 16) of the
participants said that they did not receive any information
about a choice other than the plea they were offered and
half of the participants (n D 20) said that were told they
would go to jail/prison if they rejected the deal. Only 15%
(n D 6) explicitly stated that they were told by their attor-
neys that the case could go to trial if they did not accept a
plea deal, and 12.5% (n D 5) said they were told that the
district attorney would offer them a new deal if they
rejected the one on the table.
DISCUSSION
Overall, our data reveal a mixed picture of the plea deal
process for juvenile offenders in New York City. On the
one hand, the majority of the offenders in our sample
reported that their plea decisions were autonomous and
most had favorable impressions of their attorneys. On the
other hand, many of our participants displayed basic deficits
in their understanding of plea deals and had incomplete
knowledge of the options available to them (e.g., most
youth did not know they could have a trial), and their deci-
sions to accept their plea deals appear to have been overly
influenced by short-term outcomes. We address each of
these in turn.
Knowledge of Plea Deals
Less than half of our participants mentioned more than one
of our five target items (i.e., offered by prosecutor; reduc-
tion in time/charges; admission of guilt; waiver of right to
trial; waiver of appeal) when asked to describe a plea deal
in general. Similarly, less than a quarter of participants
could articulate more than one collateral consequence of
accepting a plea deal and, although most knew they had a
choice in taking the deal or not, few were clear as to their
legal options.
Limited attorney contact may have contributed to the
lack of understanding. Most youth in our sample met with
their attorneys on only a handful of occasions. Presumably,
given the responses provided by the participants, these
meetings were almost always held in conjunction with
another procedural matter (e.g., court hearing). It is unclear
how much information the youth were given by their attor-
neys at these meetings. Participant responses suggest either
that the attorneys gave the youth very limited information
regarding their legal options or that the youth understood
and retained only a very limited amount of the information
they received. For example, many of the youth we inter-
viewed said that they were told that if they didn’t take their
pleas they would serve their original sentences. Although in
practice this might be the result (i.e., it is possible that
many of these youth might have lost at trial), legally every
defendant has a right to due process. Whether or not this
was explained to the youth cannot be determined, as we did
not interview the youths’ attorneys; but this is clearly what
our participants retained.
Factors that Contributed to Plea Decisions
Over the course of our interview, we asked participants two
kinds of questions related to outcomes associated with plea
deals. We asked them about outcomes or consequences
associated with plea deals in general and with their own
plea deals; and we asked them what kinds of things people,
in general, might think about when deciding to take a plea
deal and what they, themselves, thought about when mak-
ing their own decisions. In general, our participants focused
on short-term consequences both when asked, in general,
why a person might take a plea and when asked why they
accepted their own plea. For example, one of our partici-
pants relayed that “going to court was too hard because I
had to go to school in the morning” and so he took the plea
to avoid having to go back to court; likewise, a common
response from many participants reflected ending the judi-
cial process. In contrast, when asked to specify the conse-
quences associated with taking/rejecting a plea-deal—their
own deals or plea deals in general—most of the responses
we received reflected long-term outcomes (although less
than a quarter of youth provided responses pertaining to
consequences associated with accepting their own deals
and only half articulated the factors that contributed to their
decisions). While acknowledging that many youth did not
respond to all of our questions, it is not surprising that a
juvenile offender in our study could be quite capable of
identifying long-term consequences (positive or negative)
associated with accepting a plea deal and yet, not consider
these outcomes when making his or her own decision. By
middle adolescence, in laboratory settings and on surveys,
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adolescents are able to identify, consider and analyze risks
attached to given options (Fischhoff et al., 2000); nonethe-
less, in the real world the decisions made by adolescents
often do not reflect this ability. Relative to adults, adoles-
cent decision making is compromised by a greater tendency
to focus on short- rather than long-term consequences (e.g.,
Crone & van der Molen, 2004; Hooper et al., 2004; Stein-
berg et al., 2009) and this is magnified in contexts that exert
high cognitive demand and/or that entail emotionally
charged and personally salient outcomes (e.g., van Duijven-
voorde et al., 2010).
However, whether or not this tendency to focus on short-
term, positive outcomes is disproportionate to what might
be seen in similarly situated adult offenders remains an
important question for future research. A competing, or
complimentary, hypothesis that must be considered is that
attorney communication plays a role in what factors are
given most weight by these youth in their decision making,
or—more likely—that there is an interaction between
developmental stage and the quality/quantity of attorney
communication. It seems reasonable that youth, assuming
similar intellectual function, will require more time and
greater simplification and repetition of complex informa-
tion than adults facing the same choices.
Implications and Directions for Future Research
There is nothing in our data that suggests that our partici-
pants felt coerced into accepting a plea agreement; in fact,
most of our participants perceived their decisions to accept
their pleas as autonomous and the majority had favorable
views of their attorneys. Nonetheless, our data do suggest
that our participants showed deficits in both legal under-
standing and appreciation of the consequences of accepting
a felony plea. Impaired understanding and appreciation
raises the question of competence, and competence, as dis-
cussed earlier, is a necessary prerequisite for voluntariness.
Furthermore, the youth in our study appear to have been
strongly influenced by short-term factors that were mostly
related to escaping what was experienced as an aversive
process. Thus, our data provide a first look at the plea deal
experiences of youth charged as adults and point to several
potential areas for future research.
First, while it is tempting to assume that any or all of the
deficits we report arise from developmental immaturity,
these deficits might be present in all offenders regardless of
age. While a concerning finding either way, an important
question is whether or not, as a group, youth charged as
adults are at increased risk for having their due process
rights violated during the plea deal process, and if so,
whether or not these vulnerabilities manifest differently, or
are more or less pronounced, at different points of develop-
ment (i.e., early, middle, and late adolescence).
The non-mentally diseased adult is the generally
accepted benchmark for legal competence, and issues of
competence are typically raised about adult defendants
only when symptoms of mental illness or cognitive
impairment are present. Mental illness and cognitive
impairment surely raise similar questions in adolescent
defendants, but developmental immaturity is rarely consid-
ered with respect to the competency of juvenile offenders
to enter into plea deals. Furthermore, situations and circum-
stances (e.g., the immediate appeal of ending an arduous
process) that are non-coercive for an adult may be coercive
for an adolescent by virtue of developmental differences in
the valuations of outcomes (e.g., Miller & Byrnes, 2001a,
2001b), weighing of long-term risks against short-term ben-
efits (e.g., Crone & van der Molen, 2004), tendencies to
comply to authority (e.g., Grisso et al., 2003), suggestibility
(Gudjonsson, 2003; Redlich & Goodman, 2003; Scott-Hay-
ward, 2007) and susceptibility to emotion (e.g., Prencipe
et al., 2011). However, it is not unreasonable to assume
that many (if not most) adult offenders exhibit the decision-
making vulnerabilities of typically developing adolescents.
Most of the existing research on age-related changes in cog-
nitive and psychosocial functioning has been conducted in
non-offending samples. Furthermore, with some notable
exceptions (e.g., Grisso et al., 2003) much of the research
on the vulnerability of adolescents in specific legal contexts
has compared normally developing adolescents to normally
developing adults, or, like this paper, has examined offend-
ing juveniles but not included adult offender comparison
samples. Research comparing adult and juvenile offenders
in the plea-deal context is necessary to establish this matter,
especially in light of data from a recent study that reported
low plea comprehension in adult offenders who were none-
theless competent to stand trial (Redlich & Summers,
2012) and in light of recent criticisms (e.g., Caldwell, 2011;
Dervan, 2012) that the plea-bargaining system as it is in
operation today may be inherently coercive, even for adult
offenders. Along these lines, future developmental studies
should expand on our current interview protocol to include
questions that directly assess plea-deal decision making
(e.g., identifying and weighing pros and cons) and that tap
both individual and age-related differences in impulsivity
and perspective taking.
Second, while studies using adult comparison samples
will certainly help elucidate whether the deficits displayed
by the youth in our study are a result of developmental
immaturity, limited attorney contact/communication, or an
interaction between the two, it remains that the youth in
our study show deficits that may have compromised the
integrity of their decision making in the plea context. At
present, attorneys are in the best position to assess for defi-
ciencies in their client’s legal knowledge and appreciation
of consequences, and to mitigate potential threats to com-
petent decision making by their clients. To work with
youth effectively, complex information must be broken
down into small chunks and gone over slowly, giving the
youth time to process the information. While the heavy
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caseloads of most public defenders present an obstacle to
such an investment of time and resources, among the
likely contributing factors to deficits in understanding and
appreciation, communication is the main variable over
which attorneys have control. Thus, future research should
address ways to help attorneys identify deficits and com-
municate information to clients effectively and efficiently
(see Buss, 2000 for suggestions on the ways in which
attorneys can promote the decision-making competency of
their juvenile clients). Such research will likely be well
received by attorneys in light the recent Supreme Court
rulings in Missouri v. Frye (2012) and Lafler v. Cooper
(2012) that defendants have a constitutional right to effec-
tive counsel during the plea bargaining process. Our
research team is presently working on a short checklist
designed to help attorneys efficiently assess for deficits in
their clients understanding and decision-making capacities
to allow them to more efficiently allocate their limited
resources and to screen for clients who may need formal
competency evaluations.
Third, adjudicative competence is a broad construct and
the content of competency assessments may differ based
on the tasks a defendant is required to perform in a given
context (Roesch, Zapf, Golding, & Skeem, 1999). Few
forensic assessment instruments for adjudicative compe-
tency include more than a handful of general questions
related to plea-deal decision making. Given that most
youth charged as adults take plea deals, future research
should look at whether existing instruments are adequate
guides for examiners who assess adjudicative competency
of youth and/or whether new instruments are necessary to
address this gap.
Finally, while we were restricted from asking about ini-
tial charges and plea discounts in this study, future research
should seek to document the discrepancies between initial
charges (and attendant punishments) and the plea discounts
offered to youth. Researchers should also experimentally
manipulate initial charges and discounts to determine if
youth are more or less likely to be influenced by wider dis-
parities than are adults.
Conclusion
This is the first study, to our knowledge, that examined the
plea-deal experiences of a sample of adolescents who were
charged and processed in an adult system, and interpreta-
tion of our data are necessarily limited by a relatively small
sample size and lack of adult comparison data. However,
while more research on plea deals in this population is
urgently needed, our data suggest that juveniles charged as
adults might have deficits in legal understanding and in the
appreciation of consequences that could render the plea-
deal process for these youth fundamentally unfair. As such,
attorneys and courts should consider, and take steps to
mitigate, potential risks to due process rights violations of
youth adjudicated in the adult system.
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